I’ve always known that the energy transition is a hard sell. Trying to discuss melting glaciers, roll-out of solar and batteries, without a decent glass of wine is almost impossible. LinkedIn, meanwhile, has developed its own ecosystem of fitness and virtue influencers, doing their best to make us feel guilty about… having a glass of wine. As if people in climate tech didn’t already carry enough existential guilt over the CO₂ footprint of a Friday steak and bottle! So here’s some good news - you can now at least stop worrying about the wine part! By pure chance, I discovered that a small vineyard in Italy — Vignaioli Contrà Soarda, together with Carbon Jacked — is producing what they call a carbon-negative wine. What does that mean in practice?
 • Organic viticulture
 • A gravity-fed cellar (no pumps - energy saving!)
 • Proper Scope 1–3 carbon accounting
 • Verified carbon credits that more than offset what’s left Will it save the planet? 
No. Will it make you feel better? 
Well, maybe. Depends on your view of whether carbon credits are a scam or a genuinely smart way to save the planet. And before starting on THIS argument, it is best to open a bottle of red. Happy Friday.
 Drink responsibly.
 And, as always, account for Scope 3.

Today is the first monthly check-in on the 23 FOAK climate tech projects  I said I’d track publicly in 2026! FOAKs get talked about more and more, which is definitely a good thing! I’m following up on the developments of the largest and most interesting FOAK projects in climate tech. I first go over the good news, then the bad, and you’ll get an updated table at the end! The good news (actual execution happened) H2 Green Steel (now Stegra)  signed a long-term supply agreement with Thyssenkrupp. This is good news, as Stegra narrowly avoided bankruptcy at the end of last year. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/swedish-steel-startup-stegra-signs-deal-supply-thyssenkrupp-materials-2026-01-12/ https://www.norran.se/english/engelska/artikel/stegra-a-multi-billion-kronor-lifeline-within-reach/rmpymv1r Linglong One (ACP100 SMR)  completed a successful non-nuclear steam-run test in late December. I’m putting it here, as I’ve missed it a month earlier. It is worth noting that the project has been under development since 2010, the design of the 125 MW SMR passed a safety review by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2016. The plant is expected to start commercial energy generation in the first half of 2026. Can’t wait! https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/chinese-smr-completes-non-nuclear-steam-start-up-test Kairos Power in the USA cleared a non-trivial bottleneck by securing HALEU nuclear fuel  from the DOE for its 50 MW SMR. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/federal-government-to-send-kairos-power-enriched-uranium-for-reactors/ar-AA1UJ1El 1komma5 DAC signed an agreement with Bain & Company to purchase 9000 tons worth of CDR credits over the next three years. Good for them, but why on Earth do B&C need those is a mystery to me. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/1pointfive-and-bain-company-announce-agreement-for-direct-air-capture-carbon-removal-credits-1035706632   NEOM Green Hydrogen  proudly crossed the “90% built” line. It was also the only project of the infamous “The Line” that survived recent cuts. https://fuelcellsworks.com/2026/01/13/green-investment/neom-s-green-hydrogen-megaproject-reaches-90-percent-build-milestone     The warning signs (already visible in January) Commonwealth Fusion  is playing around with AI mock-ups of its 400 MW SFR (small fusion reactor) and planning for commercial delivery in 2030. This could have been in the “Good news” section, but come on, after reading the news on Linglong One, who on Earth will believe them? https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/cfs-accelerates-commercial-fusion-with-siemens-nvidia   ZeroAvia  stretches timelines and rejigs certifications after last year’s layoffs and securing another funding round. https://www.flightglobal.com/aerospace/zeroavia-rejigs-za600-certification-plan-after-funding-constraints-force-sweeping-layoffs/166056.article Lyten taking over Northvolt’s facilities has been going nowhere so far, while Lyten has been pulling out of the USA. https://industryradar.com/sweden/corporatenews/lyten-acquisition-of-northvolt-delayed/ https://www.norran.se/english/engelska/artikel/skelleftea-boost-lyten-bets-on-ex-northvolt-assets/r511wqnj   Eavor-Loop (Germany)  a thermal energy startup, delivered electricity to the grid  from a closed-loop geothermal system. This should’ve been in the good news section, but with an output of just 0,5MW out of planned 2 MW, Eavor-Loop seems to face the same ramp-up difficulties as Climeworks did last year. Read an insightful deep dive by Michael Barnard here: https://cleantechnica.com/2026/01/15/when-next-generation-geothermal-meets-first-of-a-kind-reality/   The noise – companies stirring up news, but making little progress Net Zero Teesside  in the UK made it to the news this month after striking a deal for 7000 tons of steel for its project with MMEC, a Chinese steel supplier. The company caused a public outrage over sidelining UK steel producers. https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/other/use-of-chinese-steel-for-multi-billion-pound-net-zero-teesside-project-branded-slap-in-face/ar-AA1UuVAp     Early conclusion (subject to revision, monthly) For me, the most exciting result of the month comes from China, with Linglong One completing non-nuclear tests and gearing up for the market. The disappointment of the month is Eavor-Loop, failing to generate any significant amounts of energy. Thermal power generation has been much hyped last year, only to stumble at the first launch. I’ll keep tracking these projects every month: what changes, what slips, and what gets renamed to sound like progress. Just tracking FOAKs meeting reality. February update coming first week of March!

My friend Jean Gravellier once drove me around the Dunkirk area. I’ve seen the ArcelorMittal steel plant, the nuclear power station, and locations for future battery gigafactories. “Why there?” I thought. So many polluting industries, all in one place? There are many reasons, but one is permitting - businesses with a higher environmental footprint go where it is easier to get approval from local governments. There is a reason that many battery companies in Europe are in Hungary. There is one particular solvent used in making lithium-ion batteries that requires tens of millions of euros in capital expenditure, several million euros in operating costs, and many months or years to navigate permitting procedures. This is NMP (N-Methyl-2-pyrrolidone). It is used to bind together various components of the cathode, creating a slurry, and after pasting a cathode slurry on aluminium foil, you need to dry it and safely divert NMP. The drying process is one of the two most energy-intensive stages in lithium-ion battery manufacturing. It is also hazardous to human health, so extreme caution is required. All gigafactories have dedicated systems for handling NMP - dedicated ventilation systems, solvent recovery units, wastewater treatment, additional permitting, and a permanent HSE burden. NMP demonstrates that discussions about battery competitiveness, like LFP versus NMC, are incomplete. Some of the most consequential cost drivers sit much earlier in the process, in places that rarely make it into public announcements or pitch decks. Removing NMP from the equation would make battery making process much less toxic and eliminate tens of millions of euros in capital and operating costs, and speed up the roll-out of EU gigafactories. But that’s not all. In the next post, I’ll look at why this solvent question becomes even more problematic once you factor in localisation and Europe’s dependence on imported battery chemicals.

Another sign of the erosion of the European industrial base - this time in the chemical industry. Is innovation the right answer? The FT reported today on the sorry state of Europe's chemicals sector, citing an 80% fall in investment in 2025 and the doubling of plant closures during the same year. The culprits are all too familiar and can be applied to almost any European industry: - high energy prices - “suffocating” bureaucracy - cheap Chinese imports The chemical industry underpins almost all other industries, including the one dear to my heart - lithium-ion batteries. Problems with chemicals will send shockwaves across other industries. The FT article is strong on the causes of the investment crises, but thin on the solutions. You can’t wish away all of the three problems, and there is not much you can do about them in the short term. But you can find workarounds. Innovation could be one such workaround. Necessity is the mother of all inventions after all. While chemical process innovation can take years, many advancements have already been made in the labs, and are itching to reach industrial scale. I am seeing this firsthand, working with startups that can: - circumvent high energy prices by using several times less energy - dodge bureaucracy and regulations, by CO2 utilisation and new, less toxic processes - compete with Chinese suppliers head-on on price, or use CBAM as a moat. The beauty of it is that time-to-market is measured in a few years rather than decades. What is your opinion? Can Europe innovate itself out of this crisis, or are we too entangled in bureaucracy?

“Things that people assume are going to be easier are often way harder than they think.” If there was one quote about #FOAK, this would probably be it. And it doesn’t matter what you are building - an #SMR or a FOAK chemical plant. The assumptions you make about some steps being easy always come back and kick your ass. The quote comes from Kairos Power CEO Mike Laufer, in a podcast episode of The Green Blueprint. Mike and his team are currently building Hermes-2 - a 50 MW SMR demonstration unit in the USA. They have recently signed several off-take agreements, including one with Google, to build several commercial-scale SMRs of 75-MW each over the next decade. I’m not a big believer in SMRs generating any commercial amounts of energy in the next 10 years. But nuclear projects are among the toughest to plan, manage and build. This is why I was listening intently, and here are some of the takeaways: - Modularity reduces repeat risk, not FOAK risks (!) - Manufacturing constraints, including those up the supply chain, must be design inputs - Problems emerge in connecting different systems, not the core technology The episode holds more insights, so if you are in nuclear, SMR, or just building a FOAK, hit the “Play” button ! The Green Blueprint is a great podcast on FOAKs in the USA. If you are interested in how European climate companies deal with FOAK, “valley of death” and scaling up, watch or listen to my podcast WattsUpWithStartups !

This week, I was drafting a report for six months of my work for an early-stage energy and AI startup, so I thought, why not share what I can? So here it goes. The value from advisors to startups is usually customer or investor connections, and some PR representation. I can deliver very little of those. So why get one if he can’t deliver the usual advisor value? Let’s see what I did: • Stress-tested the core business logic across multiple markets and rollout scenarios, finally narrowing down the best geographical market for the first product roll-out.
 • Built a bottom-up financial model that forced necessary early conversations about unit economics, customer acquisition costs, and cash timing.
 • Reworked the pitch materials so that strategy, numbers, and execution risks were aligned, and investors noticed that immediately.
 • Acted as a sparring partner to the founder on priorities: what not to do in year one matters as much as what to do. The outcome was not just a cleaner deck or a better spreadsheet. It was a shared operating logic between the founder, first investors and his early team. In my case, having an advisor is more akin to having a pro-consultant on board, who, instead of jumping from top-MBA programs into consulting, has managed P&Ls for several industrial companies over the last decade. Do you use advisors, and if so, what for?

Once or twice a year, if you stay long enough in climate and battery scale-ups, you encounter a technology that politely asks you to forget thermodynamics, manufacturing constraints, and twenty years of painful industrial learning. Like a lot of other things, this year’s entry arrived early. The battery world is currently excited about Donut Lab solid state battery. Let’s outline the plausible range of outcomes: 1 Worst case: it’s a scam. Svolt has already called it out (you’ll understand why if you read to the end of this post). 2 Best case: it’s not really a solid-state battery in the way the industry understands that term. After reading Michael Sura’s exceptional technology deep dive , a far more charitable interpretation is that we’re looking at something closer to a supercapacitor bolted onto a conventional lithium-ion system. Now, to understand Donut Labs from a non-technology perspective, let’s have a brief look at credibility signals — always a useful exercise when physics seems unusually cooperative. Founder profile. 
The headline combines electric mobility and AI. Historically, people who put AI in their LinkedIn bio tend to have strong opinions about geopolitics, repost Elon Musk and Sam Altman, and explain the future of humanity better than Foreign Policy. Building and operating battery factories is, understandably, a relatively easy exercise. Time allocation.
 The founder is listed as active in thirteen organisations, as founder or advisor, including the Forbes Technology Council. This suggests exceptional time-management skills (hustle culture!) and that gigafactory execution has become remarkably asynchronous. Team composition. 
One engineer. 
Which makes sense. After the collapse of Northvolt, hiring large engineering teams is clearly overrated. Manufacturing can always be outsourced to a photovoltaic lab. Or a university cleanroom. Or optimism. Hype level. 
Impressive. No notes here. To be clear: this is not an attack. On the contrary, I am genuinely proud that Europe finally produced a battery startup that promises zero Chinese dependency, perfect performance, and effortless manufacturability — all at once. The battery exists, for now, primarily on a website, in press releases and in a motorcycle. But if I knew how to ride a motorcycle, I would probably pre-order one immediately. Progress requires belief. Happy Friday!

Who: The A Method for Hiring by Geoff Smart and Randy Street treats recruitment as an execution discipline rather than an exercise in intuition. The core argument is simple and uncomfortable: most hiring failures are not caused by a lack of talent in the market, but by sloppy decision-making. Interviews reward confidence, charm, and familiarity. Real performance, however, shows up later — in execution, judgment under pressure, and consistency over time. The book proposes a structured, evidence-based alternative: define outcomes first, assess candidates against those outcomes, and rely on past behavior rather than projected potential or personal chemistry. I used several of the techniques from Who when I was CEO of a lithium-ion manufacturing company. This was a capital-intensive, operationally unforgiving environment: factories do not tolerate “learning on the job,” and hiring mistakes compound quickly. I still made plenty of mistakes — some roles were defined too vaguely, some references were checked too late, and in a few cases urgency overruled process. But compared to earlier phases of my career, the difference was material. The discipline of scorecards, chronological interviews, and reference triangulation consistently outperformed the familiar alternative: hiring people you “like” after a good conversation. That is where the book is at its strongest. It does not promise perfect hires. It promises fewer bad ones. And in scaling organizations — especially industrial or deep-tech companies — avoiding one bad hire at a critical node is often more valuable than landing a theoretical superstar. What I also appreciate is that Who aligns well with reality at the FOAK and scale-up stage. When incentives are misaligned and pressure is high, personal affinity becomes a dangerous bias. Structure acts as a counterweight. It forces founders and CEOs to articulate what success actually looks like in a role, rather than projecting their own preferences onto a candidate. This is not a book about culture, motivation, or leadership philosophy. It is a book about decision hygiene. If you are building or scaling a company where execution matters more than storytelling — factories, infrastructure, energy, hardware — this is required reading. Hiring based on who you enjoy talking to is easy. Hiring based on who will deliver, repeatedly, under real constraints is harder. Who provides a practical framework for doing the latter.

Europe spends a lot of time talking about battery gigafactories. We discuss cell chemistries, subsidy schemes, factory locations, and how many gigawatts of capacity will be built by when. All of that matters. But a part of the battery value chain rarely makes it into these conversations, even though it has a disproportionate impact on cost, risk, and credibility. Battery chemicals. Not cells or packs, but the solvents, electrolytes, and precursors that sit upstream of every cathode line and every factory budget. This is where a large share of capital intensity, operational complexity, and embedded emissions comes from. This layer determines how expensive a factory really is once energy use, HSE requirements, and permitting are factored in. It determines how exposed “European” batteries remain to imports and geopolitical risk. And it determines how much CO₂ is embedded in every battery long before it leaves the factory gate. You can build cell assembly plants in Europe and still import cost, emissions, and strategic vulnerability if this layer stays external. Over the next few weeks, I will unpack this part of the battery story, using one very concrete industrial project as a reference point. Not as a promotion, but as a way to talk about how batteries are made, financed, and scaled in Europe. If Europe gets the chemistry layer wrong, the gigafactory debate risks becoming an exercise in industrial theatre rather than industrial strategy.

EU eased CO₂ regulations for automakers at the end of last year. Almost immediately, parts of the LinkedIn community declared the EV transition dead: OEMs will return to ICE, Europe will lose the race, and incumbents will be finished. I argued the opposite. The legislation did not reopen a real path back to combustion. It was a gambit - giving away something to score a bigger victory. In practice, it pushed European carmakers toward EVs. That is exactly what is now being confirmed by a recent article in the Financial Times. Having spent so much effort to reverse the EU regulations and getting nothing for it, Stellantis, Renault, Kia, all confirm that they are doubling down on EVs. This gives me hope that this year we will hear more about new, cheaper EVs, new factories and battery plants opening, rather than more political haggling.

I used to think that US sanctions were reserved for criminals, dictators and Russians. Well, a few months ago, an ICC judge authorised an investigation into alleged war crimes by US personnel in Afghanistan. Then she was sanctioned. Her bank access was frozen. Amazon and Microsoft shut down her accounts. She was treated like an international criminal. If that wasn’t a wake-up call for all working with the USA, this January should have been. With Trump openly threatening tariffs and economic retaliation against anyone opposing the US takeover of Greenland, what should hardware businesses do? You do not want to discover mid-factory build that your supply chain is suddenly blocked or prohibitively expensive. Contracts, suppliers, banking access, and digital infrastructure can be switched off overnight, and you don’t have to do anything wrong. I would go as far as saying this: the US is becoming uninvestable and uncontractable for long-cycle hardware projects. The idea of a neutral, rules-based global business environment is gone. Has your business or project been hit by geopolitics lately?

What's the biggest myth  #FOAK  founders believe about getting their first  clients ?  “If the technology is good enough, customers will find us.” Sometimes they do. Most of the time, they don’t. I’ve seen world-class  #climate  and industrial technologies stall for years — not because the product failed, but because founders were pitching everyone, hiring the wrong sales profiles, and waiting for “inbound” that never came. Cold emails. Demo days. Visibility. All useful — occasionally. But not a strategy. After watching the same mistakes repeat, I distilled what actually works into a 5-step framework for how FOAK startups find their first real clients. It starts with a simple shift most teams miss: not all clients behave the same. Some are hungry. Some are cautious. Some are indifferent. Treat them the same — and you lose years. I’ve laid out the framework in the slides below. It’s not flashy and it’s not marketing theory. It’s how first conversations turn into real contracts in FOAK environments. If you’re building something that has to work in the real world — this will save you time. Let me know which step hits closest to home!